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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ARGUMENT 
I. A.J. DEAN'S INADVERTENT NONCOMPLIANCE WITH 
THE ORDER OF APRIL 5, 1994 COMPELLING 
DISCOVERY CANNOT REASONABLY BE CHARACTERIZED 
AS WILLFUL, IN BAD FAITH, OR FAULT. 
A.J. Dean and the Roberts agree that the standard of review 
for the imposition of discovery sanctions is set forth in 
Morton v. Continental Baking cp,, 938 p.2d 27i, 274, (Utah 1997) 
and Wright v. Wrightf 941 P.2d 646 (Utah App. 1997). (A.J. Dean's 
Brief on Appeal, p. 2; Roberts' Brief, p. 8, 9.) 
"We have never expressed any rule which 
delineates a specific level of behavior which 
must be met before rule 37 sanctions are 
warranted. As stated previously, a party's 
conduct merits sanctions under rule 37 if any 
of the following circumstances are found: (1) 
the party's behavior was willful; (2) the 
party has acted in bad faith; (3) the court 
can attribute some fault to the party; or (4) 
the party has engaged in persistent dilatory 
tactics tending to frustrate the judicial 
process.(emphasis added). 
938 P.2d at 276. 
A.J. Dean accepts Roberts1 definition of willful conduct in 
this context (Roberts' Brief, p. 10); to find that a party's 
behavior has been willful, there need only be "any intentional 
failure as distinguished from involuntary noncompliance." Arnica 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettlerr 768 P.2d 950, 961 (Utah App. 1989). 
In this appeal A.J. Dean challenges the conclusion of the 
trial court that its noncompliance satisfies the standard 
described in Morton. A.J. Dean's failure to meet the April 5, 
1994 deadline was merely the last domino to fall in a sequence of 
inadvertent errors by both parties, beginning with Roberts' 
mistaken service of form medical malpractice interrogatories. 
A. The sequence of errors began with the 
Roberts' service of form medical malpractice 
discovery which had nothing to do with the 
issues in this pase^ 
The interrogatories served by the Roberts on A.J. Dean, 
which eventually gave rise to the default sanction, are included 
in Addendum A to A.J. Dean's Brief on Appeal. They are medical 
malpractice interrogatories. The Roberts characterize these 
interrogatories as flawed by a clerical or typographical error. 
More accurately, a cursory review reveals that the questions 
posed have absolutely nothing to do with the substantive issues 
of this case. In the context of this lawsuit they are nonsense. 
The logical response of any attorney confronted with such 
2 
questions is properly puzzlement and confusion. 
A.J. Dean communicated its confusion to Jaryl L. Rencher, 
Roberts1 counsel, as shown by Rencher's letters to A.J. Dean's 
counsel, Randall Marshall.1 Rencher's letter of November 11, 
1993 states: 
"There was typographical error in them and I 
have corrected that in the correspondence to 
this individual named "Robert" which I 
informed you I prepared immediately after my 
conversation with him. Please excuse the 
references to medical malpractice and instead 
insert "information relative to this case and 
the property in question." (R. 405.) 
Rencher's letter of December 9, 1993, reiterates the 
request: 
"Robert indicated to me that he acknowledges 
there had been some typographical mistakes in 
my clients interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents and I suggested that 
he consider any references to medical 
malpractice or hospitalization as instead 
involving allegations in this suit. If you 
will substitute "any allegations or claims in 
this suit or the property in question" for 
those typographical errors I would appreciate 
it." (R. 406.) 
In these two letters, Rencher shifted the responsibility 
for his initial clerical mistake to Marshall. It was left up to 
Marshall to determine how to make sense of the non sequitur 
interrogatories, and to decide which should disregarded and which 
should be answered. 
1
 Both letters were included as exhibits to Roberts' 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Compel. (R. 384.) 
Roberts' Brief on Appeal, p. 4, confirms that Marshall was 
instructed to "disregard inapplicable interrogatories." 
Marshall was to decide which interrogatories to disregard. 
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Marshall tried to comply. On January 24, 1994, Marshall 
filed A.J. Dean's responses to the flawed discovery. (R. 433-
444.) In the response Marshall included a general objection 
referencing the irrelevancy of the questions posed. (R. 434.) 
Rencherfs dissatisfaction with Marshall's effort to correctly 
guess how to respond to the botched interrogatories was the basis 
for the Motion to Compel that gave rise to the entry of the 
default sanction.2 Not until March 21, 1994, at the hearing on 
the Motion to Compel did Rencher specify which interrogatories 
would have to be answered. 
While the developing confusion originated in the bungled 
discovery served by Rencher, it does not seem fair or accurate to 
characterize the actions of the Roberts, by inadvertently serving 
the defective interrogatories, or of A.J. Dean, for not 
understanding how to respond, as "willful" in the language of 
Morton and Arnicat 
B. Monday. March 21r 1993; the hearing on 
Roberts1 Motion to Compelt 
The transcript of the March 21, 1993 hearing on Roberts' 
Motion to Compel is included in its entirety as Addendum "B" to 
A.J. Dean's Brief on Appeal. The communication that occurred 
during that hearing is important to the proper characterization 
of A.J. Dean's non-compliance. Because Green & Berry did not 
2
 At the hearing on the motion to compel, March 21, 1994, 
Marshall argued the irrelevancy to the questions posed to the 
court (R. 2379 at p. 13), and Rencher agreed to waive answers to 
all the interrogatories, with the exception of Nos. 23 and 26. 
(R. 2379 at 16-17. 
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subsequently receive timely notice of the bench ruling issued 
during hearing, the assertion that A.J. Dean's non-compliance was 
intentional is grounded in the fact that Marshall, A.J. Dean's 
counsel at the time of the hearing, and Robert Bagley, an 
employee of the firm, were present when the Court issued the 
bench ruling. The trial court concluded that A.J. Dean's failure 
to comply with the Order to Compel was intentional because these 
two individuals were in the courtroom when the bench ruling was 
made, regardless of Green & Berry's subsequent ignorance of the 
ruling. 
The discussion that took place during the hearing between 
Court and counsel was conducted in the esoteric vocabulary of 
civil procedure. Bagley, as an untrained layman, could not be 
expected to fully understand or comprehend much of what was said. 
Because he was present with attorney Randall Marshall, who 
represented A.J. Dean, Bagley was entitled to rely on the 
experience and training of Marshall for an accurate 
interpretation and explanation of the legal discussion. Bagley's 
failure to understand the ruling, and the consequences that 
attached to the ruling, was the result of ignorance, not 
intention. 
Marshall no doubt understood the bench ruling issued during 
the hearing. However, three days after the hearing, on Thursday, 
March 24, 1994 Marshall's authority to represent A.J. Dean was 
withdrawn, terminating any responsibility he had to ensure 
compliance with the bench ruling. That same day, Julie V. Lund 
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of Green & Berry picked up from Marshall's office the litigation 
file. She did not speak with Marshall personally. When she 
reviewed the file, she found nothing in it describing the bench 
ruling. (Affidavit of Julie V. Lund, R. 1795 Para. 2.) 
At this critical juncture, the attorney who knew about the 
obligation arising from the bench ruling believed his 
responsibility for the case had been terminated; and the 
attorneys who had responsibility for the case had no knowledge of 
the bench ruling. One could argue that Marshall should have done 
more to make sure that the critical information was communicated 
to new counsel, in the same way that one could argue that Rencher 
should have taken more care in proofreading the interrogatories 
that he sent out. It would not be accurate or fair to 
characterize either oversight as intentional. 
The events that subsequently took place between March 24, 
1994 and April 29, 1994, as evidenced in the Affidavits of 
Raymond Scott Berry, Julie V. Lund and Randall Marshall, are set 
forth in detail in paragraphs 14-39 of Appellants Statement of 
Facts, Brief on Appeal, pages 12-20. The factual "bottom line" 
is that Green & Berry did not learn of the critical ruling until 
April 12, 1994. (Affidavit of Julie V. Lund, R. 1795, para. 28, 
Brief on Appeal, p.16.) The immediate cause of Green & Berry 
continuing ignorance of the discovery deadline was Rencherfs 
decision on March 31, 1994 to serve the proposed form of the 
Order to Compel on Marshall, who believed he was out of the case, 
rather than on Green & Berry, which had been communicating with 
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Rencher verbally, in letters, and in pleadings as counsel for 
A.J. Dean. 
Rencher filed the Plaintiffs1 Motion to Strike the Answer of 
A.J. Dean and enter its default on April 14, 1994. (R. 688.) The 
record shows that beginning on April 14, 1994 A.J. Dean, through 
its counsel Green & Berry, took every possible action permitted 
by the Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain minimal relief from the 
order setting the April 5, 1994 deadline, filing a motion for a 
short extension of time and a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from 
the order. The Roberts received full and complete responses to 
the two unanswered interrogatories on April 18, 1994. 
(Certificate of Service R. 706; copies of complete response at R. 
1756-1784.3) 
The question raised by this appeal is whether A.J. Dean's 
failure to meet the April 5, 1994 deadline in the context 
described above was intentional or inadvertent. The facts 
establish that A.J. Dean and its counsel intended at all times to 
comply with its discovery obligations, and endeavored to the best 
of their ability to do so, despite the confusion created by the 
botched interrogatories served by the Roberts. 
3
 The completeness of these responses were never challenged 
by a Rule 37 motion. However, the Findings of Fact drafted by 
Rencher in support of the Order entering the default of A.J. 
Dean, and adopted by the trial court, include a finding that the 
response was incomplete. (R. 1567, para. 23.) A.J. Dean 
contends that the response was complete, and to the extent the 
finding is taken a face value, objects to being denied an 
opportunity to defend the responses according to the procedure 
set forth in Rule 37(a)(2). 
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The inadvertence which caused A.J. Dean to miss the April 5 
deadline was the product of a sequence of "clerical" errors 
committed by both parties, to use the word chosen by Rencher to 
describe his own mistake in sending out the wrong set of form 
interrogatories. There is no evidence which will support the 
conclusion that these errors were intentional, within the rule 
described in Morton and Arnica. Imposing the sanction of default 
for inadvertent errors is an abuse of discretion. 
II. IT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ENTER A 
SANCTION BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF 
LAW. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT GREEN 
& BERRY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RULE 5 SERVICE OF 
THE PROPOSED FORM OF ORDER WAS AN ERROR OF 
LAW. 
Morton also stands for the proposition that it is an abuse 
of discretion to enter a discovery sanction based on an erroneous 
conclusion of law. 
"We will find that a trial court has abused 
its discretion in choosing which sanction to 
impose only if there is either "an erroneous 
conclusion of law or . . . no evidentiary 
basis for the trial court's ruling." 
271 P.2d at 274. 
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the 
Roberts were not required to serve pleadings, including the 
proposed form of order containing the April 5 deadline (served 
March 31, 1994 on Marshall only), on Green & Berry after the firm 
entered its appearance in this action by a pleading entitled 
Substitution of Counsel on March 29, 1994. (Substitution at R. 
575. Conclusions of Law in Support of Order Striking Answer and 
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Entering Default, R. 1561, Para, 40 The court also concluded 
that Rencher's service of pleadings on Marshall was sufficient to 
satisfy Rule 5 obligations, although Randall and A.J. Dean 
believed that Randall's representation of the company had 
terminated on March 29, 1994. (Conclusions of Law in Support of 
Order Striking Answering and Entering Default, R. 1560-63, para. 
4-14.) 
The trial court erred in reasoning that because Marshall had 
not moved for and received leave of court to withdraw under the 
provisions of Rule 4-506 of the Code of Judicial Administration, 
he remained counsel of record for A.J. Dean, despite the 
substitution of counsel. 
The reasoning employed by the trial court is in direct 
contravention of Rule 4-507, which currently allows substitution 
of counsel without leave of court. 
Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. 
Statement of the Rule. . . 
(5) Substitution of counsel. An attorney may 
replace the current counsel of record by 
filing and serving a notice of substitution 
of counsel. Filing a substitution of counsel 
enters the appearance of new counsel of 
record and effectuates the withdrawal of the 
attorney being replaced. Where a request for 
a delay of proceedings is not made, 
substitution of counsel does not require the 
approval of the court. Where new counsel 
requests a delay of proceedings, substitution 
of counsel requires the approval of the court 
as provided in this rule. (Emphasis added) 
History: Amended effective January 15, 1990; 
April 15, 1991; May 15, 1994; November 1, 
1997. 
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Although Subsection (5) was formally added to the language 
of the Rule 4-506 effective November 1, 1997, the method 
described therein for replacing one counsel with another has long 
been standard practice, as the obvious way to synchronize the 
change of counsel without leaving any gap in representation. 
The legal conclusion of the trial court in regard to the 
substitution of counsel and Green & Berry's right to have been 
served with all pleadings after March 29, 1994 is plainly 
contrary to the current language of the rule. The only genuine 
question is whether a sanction of default premised on the error 
should be allowed to stand because the amendment occurred during 
the course of this appeal. 
The Roberts agree that Utah cases hold that changes in 
rules of civil and court administration apply retroactively where 
the change affects procedure and does not destroy vested or 
contract rights. (Roberts1 Brief on Appeal, p. 16.) Rule 4-506 
concerns court procedures only and does not, by its own terms, 
directly impact any vested right. 
In common parlance, the term "vested" implies rights awarded 
on the merits after full due process. A.J. Dean was denied the 
opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence in support of 
its valid defenses. A default judgment granted in violation of 
current law does not qualify as a "vested" right. 4 
4
 The holding in Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services, 
663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983), cited in Roberts1 Brief on Appeal, 
p. 16, is that §78-45b-4, Utah Code Ann.f facilitating the 
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The Roberts seem to agree that procedural statutes which do 
not impact vested rights apply to pending actions. The Roberts1 
claim that this action is not a pending action is impossible to 
accept in light of the fact half the claims in this case are 
still pending in the trial court. The claims of the Roberts' 
against the defendants Milton Muir Construction, Milton Muir and 
Gale Muir are still before the trial court, and involve the same 
factual circumstances relating to the construction of the 
Roberts' driveway that gave rise to the claims against A.J. 
Dean.5 
The lower court's mistaken interpretation of Rule 4-506 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. When a discovery sanction of 
default is premised on an abuse of discretion, the sanction 
should be set aside. 
III. THE LIMITATIONS PLACED ON A.J. DEAN'S 
PARTICIPATION AT THE HEARING ON DAMAGES WERE 
IMPROPER. 
The hearing on damages had two main purposes. First, the 
Roberts were required to make a prima facie showing of the proof 
of their causes of actions. Second, the Roberts were required to 
prove their unliquidated damages by competent evidence. 
(Conclusions of Law in support of Order denying A.J. Dean's 
recovery of child support obligations, enacted in 1975, will be 
interpreted to apply retroactively to the child support payments 
owed by Pilcher under a 1965 Utah divorce decree. 
5
 This is an interlocutory appeal. The default judgment 
rendered against A.J. Dean contained a Rule 54(b) certification. 
(R. 2351 para. 4.) 
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Motion for Full Participation in Further Proceedings (R. 1678-
1682, para. 1-22, describing limitations to be placed on A.J. 
Dean's participation in the damages hearing.) A.J. Dean 
generally challenges the constraints on its participation in the 
damages hearing imposed by the trial court. 
A. The Roberts1 presentation Qf prppf Qf prima 
facie claims through proffer of counsel 
rather than direct testimony was improper. 
The Roberts presented the evidence of the prima facie proof 
of their claims by direct narrative proffer of their counsel 
rather than by direct testimony.6 (R. 2386 at p. 43-90.) Counsel 
for A.J. Dean was not permitted to cross-examine counsel for the 
Roberts, Lambert, or the Roberts themselves; present direct 
evidence; make legal argument; or participate in any fashion in 
regard to the presentation of prima facie proof. The narrative 
as actually delivered by Lambert came out as a melange of legal 
exposition and argument, sprinkled here and there with reference 
to "facts" that the Roberts would testify to if called. Lambert 
made no effort to limit his proffer to facts that could 
6
 Lambert, the Roberts1 counsel, described the manner in 
which he would proceed as follows; "So , all I'm prepared to do 
as far as that is concerned is to, for instance, go to the 
applicable claim, cite to the Court the appropriate 
authority to state what the elements are, explain to the court 
why the complaint is sufficient to state a claim..., let the 
court rule on whether it does or does not, and proceed to the 
next claim." (R. 2386 at p. 36.) Berry objected to proceeding in 
this manner, and his objection was overruled. (Id. at 37-38.) 
Lambert proceeded as described, with the Roberts being sworn and 
adopting as their testimony the narrative presented by Lambert 
at its conclusion. Berry continued to make objections during 
the course of the narrative which were overruled. 
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conceivably be known by the Roberts. 
For example, addressing the claim of trespass, Lambert 
proffered that his clients would testify that A.J. Dean did not 
receive permission to enter their property from Milton Muir, the 
general contractor. (R. 2386 at p. 45.) The Roberts obviously 
could not have personal knowledge concerning Muir's statements to 
A.J. Dean. In the same fashion, Lambert proffered that Mrs. 
Roberts, a housewife, would testify that A.J. Dean breached the 
standard of care owed by ready mix concrete companies. (R. 2386 
at p. 49.) The narrative proffer is replete with similar 
examples of Lambert proffering as testimony "facts" which were 
completely beyond even the theoretical personal knowledge of his 
clients. 
What constitutes "competent evidence" is defined by Rule 602 
of the Utah Rules <?f Evidence. 
Rule 602. Lack of personal knowledge. 
"A witness may not testify to a matter unless 
evidence is introduced sufficient to support 
a finding that the witness has personal 
knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove 
personal knowledge may, but need not, consist 
of the witness1 own testimony. This rule is 
subject to the provisions of Rule 703, 
relating to opinion testimony by expert 
witnesses." 
Lambert's narrative proffer failed to include information 
that would show that his clients had the personal knowledge that 
would make them competent or qualified to testify concerning many 
of the "facts" he put in their mouths. Confident that the court 
would overrule all objections made by Berry, and aware that 
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neither he nor his clients would be subject to any cross-
examination, Lambert's presentation of prima facie proof by 
narrative proffer was nothing more than a charade, completely 
disconnected from any real effort to find the true facts. 
This manner of proceeding aptly demonstrates why the right 
to cross-examination is a bedrock element in the system of 
justice. Regardless of any particular burden of proof to be met, 
cross-examination provides the means for separating flights of 
fancy from actual fact. Without cross-examination, a statement 
that "the moon is made of green cheese" has the same evidentiary 
weight as "the light turned green." 
By choosing to eliminate all concern for the competency of 
the proffered evidence, the lower court violated its independent 
obligation try to determine the real facts as the necessary 
precursor to doing justice. 
B. A-J- Peep's gross-exfrminatjcpn of witnesses on 
the issue of unliquidated damages was 
improperly constrained. 
A.J. Dean was permitted to conduct a limited form of cross-
examination of the witnesses providing testimony of unliquidated 
damages. A. J. Dean was not allowed to introduce evidence on 
cross-examination; was not allowed to ask questions impeaching 
the Roberts based on their adoption of the "facts" presented in 
the narrative of Lambert which they adopted (R. 2386 at p. 109) ; 
was not allowed to ask questions focusing on whether the damages 
claimed were caused by A.J. Dean (R. 2386 at p. 126-127); was not 
allowed to ask Mr. Thomas, who testified about the cost to 
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replace the Roberts1 driveway, whether the driveway as installed 
functioned adequately (R. 2386 at p. 28). 
As a result of these constraints, the unliquidated damage 
testimony presents a seriously incomplete and warped version of 
facts relevant to unliquidated damages. As applied, those 
constraints had the effect of eliminating the basic requirement 
that as part of their damage case the Roberts present some 
competent evidence that the damages complained of were 
proximately caused by A.J. Dean. 
c. The clear and convincing standard which 
applies tc punitive damage claims cannot be 
satisfied by a one-sided presentation of 
evidence where the alleged wrongdoer has been 
silenced by the courtt 
At the conclusion of the hearing on damages A.J. Dean argued 
that the "clear and convincing" standard of proof required for 
the award of punitive damages under §78-18-1 et. seq. Utah Code 
Ann, could not be satisfied in a one sided evidentiary 
proceeding. (R. 2386 at p. 214-225.) The lower court disagreed, 
taking the position that just as the court could award punitive 
damages in a default matter where the defendant failed to appear 
at all, it could award punitive damages in this case despite the 
fact that A.J. Dean had appeared, and had been denied an 
opportunity to participate in a meaningful way at the damages 
hearing. (R. 2386 at p. 215-220.) 
The trial court failed to appreciate the critical difference 
between the two situations. Where a defendant is defaulted for 
making no appearance whatsoever, the defendant has consciously 
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chosen not to appear. In such situations trial courts as a rule 
try to make sure that the defendant has received personal notice 
of the proceeding, and has elected not to appear. 
In this case, A.J. Dean actively appeared, and attempted to 
participate as fully and completely in every proceeding as the 
court would allow. A.J. Dean was ready, willing and able to 
present evidence in support of its position and opposing any 
award of punitive damages, as demonstrated by the lengthy written 
proffer of evidence which it filed prior to the damages hearing. 
(R. 1976; proffer stricken, R. 2384 at p. 3.) 
Despite those efforts, the lower court chose to treat A.J. 
Dean as a ghost in the courtroom. A.J. Dean had ceased to have 
any legal substance when the default sanction was entered. This 
was not the standard "default" situation, where the defendant has 
chosen not participate. 
The issue raised in this appeal is one of first impression. 
What right does a defendant, whose answer has been stricken as 
discovery sanction, have to challenge evidence supporting an 
award of punitive damages? Can the clear and convincing 
statutory standard be met based on a totally one sided 
presentation of evidence, when the alleged wrongdoer is present 
in the courtroom actively seeking an opportunity to present 
opposing evidence? 
A.J. Dean believes that given the special place that 
punitive damage claims hold in the civil justice system, the 
court has an independent duty to determine if the statutory 
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standard has been satisfied, when a defendant is absent by 
choice, the only option available to the court may be oase its 
decision solely on the evidence presented by the plaintiff. 
However, when the defendant is present, requesting an opportunity 
to present contrary evidence, the court is duty bound to hear and 
consider that evidence. A one sided presentation of evidence in 
a proceeding in which the alleged wrongdoer has been silenced by 
the court cannot, by definition, be clear and convincing to an 
objective reviewer. 
IV. THE VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
ETHICS COMMITTED BY THE LAW FIRM REPRESENTING 
THE ROBERTS REQUIRES THAT THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT BE SET ASIDE. 
The Roberts admit that the law firm representing the Roberts 
(Hanson, Epperson and Smith, P.C., hereafter "law firm") acted in 
violation of Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct in 
representing both the Roberts and A.J. Dean at the same time. 
(Roberts1 Brief on Appeal, p. 24.) The issue on appeal is 
whether the entry of default obtained by the firm against one of 
its current clients while the conflict was present should stand.7 
The Roberts1 only argument for allowing the default to stand 
is that A.J. Dean was not prejudiced by their firm's concurrent 
represents, >f adverse parties. They contend that the law 
7
 The violation of Rule 1.7 was not discovered by A.J. Dean 
until after its default had been entered, and its Rule 60(b) 
motion to set aside the default filed. The lower court was made 
aware of the violation at oral argument on the Rule 60(b) motion. 
(R. 2383 at p. 4.) Rencher testified as to the facts of the 
conflict at the hearing on damages. (R. 2386 at p. 139-140, 165-
167.) 
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firm's withdrawal from the case when the conflict was discovered 
cured the violation, and vindicated the policy that gives force 
to Rule 1.7.8 The policy that gives rise to Rule 1.7 was 
succinctly described in Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 
1204 (Utah 1985), applying the former rule, Cannon 9, Utah Code 
Qf Professional Responsibility/ 1977. 
"A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of 
professional impropriety." The basis of this tenet is 
that society's perception of the integrity of our legal 
system may be as important as the reality, since it is 
the perception that engenders public confidence that 
justice will be dispensed. Litigants are highly 
unlikely to be able to maintain this confidence if 
their attorney in one matter is allowed simultaneously 
to sue them in another, (emphasis added) 
In Margulies, the law firm represented the plaintiffs in a 
medical malpractice action where the defendants included several 
individual physicians. Subsequent to the filing of the medical 
malpractice action, the firm agreed to represent a limited 
partnership in other litigation. Three of the limited partners 
were physician defendants in the malpractice action. The firm 
failed to consult with the doctors about the conflict, or obtain 
the permission of the doctors to represent adverse parties 
concurrently. When the physicians learned of the conflict, they 
filed a motion in the malpractice action asking that the firm be 
For the purpose of analyzing conflicts of interest, law 
firms are treated as a single entity, subject to the same rules 
that would control the actions of any single member of the firm, 
if practicing alone. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.10(a) 
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall 
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing 
alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 
or 2.2. 
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directed to withdraw i t oi» tut- representation of the medical 
malpractice plaintiffs. 
The trial court gave the firm the option of withdrawing from 
the limited partnership litigation, as opposed to being required 
to withdraw from the malpractice case. The firm withdrew from 
the partneishif lituiation. The physicians took the position 
that withdrawal from that case did n remedy the ethical 
violation, and an interlocutory appeal was taken. 
On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court determined that 
the standard of review that applied was abuse of discretion, and 
h e l l t w a s a n a j D U s e 0f discretion for the trial court to 
allow the firm to continue f|j represent the malpractice 
plaintiffs, despite the harm that withdrawal would cause the 
plaintiffs The Supreme Court specifically rejected the 
contention that the withdrawal of the firm from the partnership 
litigation after the conflict was discovered cured the violation; 
"It is our strong view that an attorney 
who is simultaneously representing two 
clients with differing interests should not 
be able to avoid conforming to Cannon 5 by 
simply dropping one of the clients at his 
option when a disqualification motion is 
filed.(citations omitted). Otherwise, little 
incentive would exist for attorneys to avoid 
dual employment by adverse parties in the 
first place." 
696 P.2d at 1202. 
Here the Roberts argue that because they were successful in 
having the default of A.J. Dean entered before the ethical 
violation was discovered, A.J. Dean should be satisfied v ie 
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fact that the Roberts found new counsel to complete the default 
proceedings. In layman's terms, if the critical aspects of 
litigation can be finished before the unwitting client discovers 
the conflict, he is stuck with the results that his ethically 
challenged attorney achieved for the favored client. 
This cynical interpretation of Rule 1.7 is completely 
inconsistent with the fundamental principles which characterize 
the relationship between lawyers and clients. 
"In finding that conflict of interest 
existed by reason of Jones, Waldo's 
concurrent representation of the appellants 
and the Margulies family, the trial court 
noted: "The law has long recognized that an 
attorney is held to the highest duty of 
fidelity, honor, fair dealing and full 
disclosure to a client.• We believe that the 
trial court's language is an excellent 
summary of the obligations imposed on counsel 
by the Utah Code of Professional 
Responsibility Cannons 4, 5, 9 (1977): the 
duty to preserve the confidences and secrets 
of the client, Cannon 4; the duty to exercise 
independent professional judgment on behalf 
of the client, Cannon 5; and the duty to 
avoid even the appearance of professional 
impropriety, Cannon 9." (emphasis added) 
696 P.2d at 1201. 
The law imposes a fiduciary duty upon lawyers forbidding 
concurrent representation of adverse parties to ensure that 
clients will not have to wonder if their attorneys are in fact 
loyal to them. The Roberts' argument that there was in fact no 
sharing of confidences within the firm misses the point. 
There is no Utah case describing the general course of 
action to be followed when a law firm, while acting in breach of 
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Rule 1.7, obtains a lesull Im cine client which severely 
prejudices a current client. However, in this case, in keeping 
with the commitment of the legal profession to self government, 
the course of action most supportive of the policies that forbid 
conflicts of interest is to set aside the default judgment, and 
a 11 ov i me ,M«.f" in proceed to trial on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The Roberts1 effort to preserve a default judgment does not 
raise the same concerns that would be present if a judgment had 
been rendered on the merits. Because the Roberts1 claims against 
the Muir defendants are pending below, returning their claims 
against A ". Dean to the trial court for full adjudication on the 
merits does not place an extraordinary burden on the Roberts or 
the trial court. Finally, the unique events that gave rise to 
the default judgment in the first place (the service of the 
wrong interrogatories, the failure to serve critical pleadings on 
the counsel of record, thp refusal of the trial court to 
recognize responsible counsel as chosen by A.J. Dean) provide 
independent justification for sending the case back for trial on 
the merits. 
DATED this Q? day of May, 1998. 
GREEN AND BERRY 
BY. 
Ra^TRond S c o t t B e r r y " 
At torney for A . J . Wepri Ready Mix 
Cement Company, I n c . , A p p e l l a n t 
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